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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
FLOW-CONTROL: THE PROBLEMS OF
REGULATING THE IMPORTATION OF
SOLID WASTE




Waste disposal is a monumental prob-
lem in this country.2 Every year, more and
more waste is produced and as landfill
space is exhausted, states are forced to
open new ones or find ways to decrease
the flow of waste into current landfills. To
address this problem, several states have
enacted statutes that forbid, tax, or
charge out-of-stlate waste entering a state's
landfills. These statutes, however, have
been struck down by the courts as viola-
tive of the Commerce Clause. National
Solid Wastes Management Association v.
Meyer was Wisconsin's attempt to craft a
waste control measure which would sur-
vive judicial review. This casenote will
discuss why efforts toward regulation have
failed in other states and why Wisconsin's
attempt was also unsuccessful. In addi-
tion, this casenote will also advance a
perspective on the topic that differs from
the traditional approach of regulating the
flow of waste into states, namely, control
over the flow of waste into landfills. Fur-
thermore, it will propose a regulatory and
enforcement plan that may have a better
chance of surviving a constitutional
challenge.
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
National Solid Wastes Management
Association, (NSWMA), together with
various other waste management and
sanitation companies, filed this action to
contest a Wisconsin state low which
regulated solid waste entering Wisconsin
landfills.? The plaintiffs contended that the
Wisconsin statute violated the Commerce
Clause4 of the United States Constitution
and that they were entitled to relief under
42 U.S.C § 1983.5
The statute in question required that
eleven recyclable materials be recovered
from commercial and residential waste
before such waste was dumped in Wis-
consin landfills.6 The plaintiff's objected
to the requirement that, for any waste
hauler to use the landfill, everyone in the
community to which the hauler belonged
must follow Wisconsin's recycling require-
ments. 7 These requirements, applied even
if that hauler does not reside in Wisconsin
and if the other members of the community
in which it did reside did not use Wiscon-
sin landfills.' The plaintiffs argued that the
statute violated the Commerce Clause be-
cause it regulated commerce occurring
wholly outside Wisconsin." They also ar-
gued that the statute was discriminatory
on its face and in practical effect, since it
treated similar products from different
points of origin differently.'o For these
reasons, plaintiffs contended the statute
should be given strict scrutiny."
Defendants argued that the statute was
not discriminatory and, therefore, should
be evaluated using a balancing op-
proach.' 2 They further contended that the
interests of the State of Wisconsin in man-
aging the use of its landfills outweighed
the burdens that the statute placed on
I 63 F.3d 652 17th Or. 1995), petition for ce. denied, 116 S.O. 1351 (U.S. April 1, 1996).
2 See Fort Grotiol Sonitary Landlill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep' of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 368-69 (1992) (RehnquistJ., dissenting) (citing United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Characterization of Municipal Solid Waste in the Untied States: 1990 Update 10).
3 National Solid Wstes Management Assn, 63 F.3d at 653. See Wis. SAt. §§ 159.07-.1 1 (Supp. 1995).
4 National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 63 F.3d at 656.
5 Id.
6 Id at 654.
- Id. at 654-655. The statute required communities wishing to use Wisconsin landfills to: collect, process, and market the eleven named solid wastes; prohibit the
entry of the eleven solid wastes into its landfills; adhere to Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources' rules on the collection and disposal of the solid wastes; take
adequate steps to enforce recycling regulations, acquire the equipment to implement recycling measures; and "make a reasonable efforr to reduce the volume of the
eleven colid wastes produced. Wis. SAi. §§ 159.07(3), .11
I National Solid Wastes Management Assn, 63 F.3d at 655.
9 Id. at 656.
to Id.
n ;d
12 Id. at 658.
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commerce." The district court agreed
with the defendants, finding that the stat-
ute was neither facially discriminatory nor
discriminatory in effect.14 In addition, the
court found the burden on commerce to
be slight compared to the benefits, which
included conservation of landfill capacity
and environmental protection.'s
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding:
the practical effect of the Wisconsin stat-
ute was to control commercial conduct
wholly outside the State of Wisconsin; the
statute discriminated against out-of-state
waste haulers; and the Wisconsin plan
overburdened interstate commerce when
the requirements were balanced against
state interests. 16
III. LEGAL HISTORY
A. The Commerce Clause - The
Basics
The Commerce Clause gives Congress
the power to regulate interstate commerce,
seemingly for the purpose of assuring free
trade between the states.17  Generally,
when the Constitution grants regulatory
powers to Congress and Congress does
not exercise those powers, the states are
not constrained by the mere existence of
the possibility that Congress might regu-
late their conduct. In other words, where
Congress is silent, the states are free to
act. However, in certain discrete in-
stances, the Supreme Court has struck
down state regulatory actions which inter-
fere with the apparent purpose of a Con-
stitutional provision. One of these
instances is the so-called dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine." This doctrine
severely limits state action which interferes
with the free-trade of interstate com-
merce.' 9 The dormant Commerce Clause,
at times, is in direct conflict with various
states' rights to decide how best to utilize
their natural resources and ensure the
health and safety of their citizens.20 The
Court has addressed this tension by allow-
ing impediments to free trade only when
the regulations, if facially discriminatory,
survive strict scrutiny, or, when not facially
discriminatory, do not unduly burden inter-
state commerce. 2' This leaves only a few
limited areas in which states can regulate
interstate commerce: protection of health
or safety;22 subsidies;23  compensatory
taxes;24 market participation;25 and non-
discriminatory regulation of commerce.
Protectionism involves a state's power
to regulate commerce to protect the health
and safety of its citizens at the expense of
interstate commerce. These regulations
are facially discriminatory or discrimina-
tory in effect and as such, are subject to
strict scrutiny. For such a regulation to sur-
vive, the state must prove that its interest is
substantial, that interstate commerce is the
cause of the problem the regulations are
designed to correct, and that there is no
non-discriminotory correction method
available.26  For example, laws which
limit or forbid the importation of potentially
dangerous materials (quarantine laws) are
not violative of the dormant Commerce
Clause because they serve the interests of
health and safety and not a desire to
promulgate economic protectionism. The
basic defense of a quarantine law is that
there is something different about a regu-
lated import that makes it more dangerous
than domestic products of the some
type.27
The flip side of health and safety pro-
tectionism is the regulation of exports for
health and safety reasons which is also
allowed, but with different restrictions. 8
The regulations must be designed to pro-
tect the citizenry and the regulations must
be the some for in-state and out-of-state
users. 29 These types of regulations are
subject to a balancing test rather than to
strict scrutiny, since they are not discrimi-
natory but may impose an undue burden
on interstate commerce. 0 Under the test
diagrammed in Pike v. Bruce Church,"
courts will weigh the substantiality of the
interest the state seeks to protect against
the magnitude of the burden the state
places on interstate commerce.
The courts also review discrimination
in favor of domestic interests using the Pike
balancing test when the state is involved
in a transaction as a market participator.




17 U.S. Const. or. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
8 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (19871.
19 See Fort Graiot Sanitary landill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep's of Nolural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359119921.
a Id. See olso C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 1682 11994).
21 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S., 573, 579 (19861 (discussing facially discriminatory state statutes). Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 11970)
(discussing facially neutral state statutes).
22 See C&A Carbone, 114 S.Ci. of 1687.
" Id.
2 Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 346 n.9 (19921
* See Philadelphia v. NewJesey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1979). See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
26 This is the traditional "compelling interest and least restrictive means" tes demanded by stric scrutiny. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617.
' Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S., 131 (19861 (allowing a prohibition against import of bailish infected with a parasite that was dangerous to Maine ecosystems).
23 Spohose-v Nebrska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
" Id. a 955-56. This case involved a regulation on groundwater exports and stated, 'jo]bviously, a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its
own citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State." Id.
' Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 13711970).
3' Id.
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When the stole enters into a commercial
transaction or operates a business, it can
conduct its business as it pleases.32 if it
wishes to do business solely with its own
citizens, that is the state's prerogative. In
these cases, the state con only regulate
the market in which it is participating, and
only the conduct of the parties to the trons-
action. It cannot creole a monopoly,
nor can it exercise control over a substan-
lial portion of a natural resource.
A state also can provide its citizens an
advantage over out-of-state competitors
without violating the Commerce Clause if
its actions do not serve to regulate com-
merce. For example, states can provide
subsides to their citizens, but not to non-
resident competitors.35 This type of state
action does not violate the Commerce
Clause because it does nothing to impede
the free flow of interstate commerce. Simi-
larly, states can seek to even the playing
field through compensatory taxes. A com-
pensatory tax is designed to assess the
costs of a state funded service which citi-
zens pay through general revenues to out-
of-state users.3
Furthermore, states retain the power to
regulate intrastate commerce. If the effects
of regulations on intrastate commerce spill
over onto interstate commerce, the courts
review them using the some two-tier ap-
proach discussed above. If the regulation
is facially discriminatory or discriminatory
in effect against out-of-state economic in-
terests, it will receive strict scrutiny.37  If
in-state entrepreneurs are treated in the
some way as out-of-state ones, the court
will apply the balancing test and the regu-
lation will stand if the state interest out-
weighs the burden on interstate
commerce.38
On the other hand, the dormant Com-
merce Clause denies states the ability to
regulate imports which are not distinct
from domestic products when they do not
regulate their own products,39 to impose a
greater burden on imports than that on
domestic products for no other reason
than that they are imports,40 to condition
imports or exports on a sister state's
agreement to reciprocate in kind,' and to
regulate, either directly or in effect, con-
duct which occurs wholly outside the
state.42
B. Regulation Of Solid Waste -
What Has Not Worked
Wisconsin is not the first state to try to
regulate waste flow into its landfills
without success. New Jersey4 3 Alo-
bamaA Oregon,s and Michigan, 6
among others, have all taken different
tacks on this issue and have come away
from the courthouse defeated.
1. NewJersey
In Philadelphia v. New Jersey,' the
first case involving solid waste disposal
considered by the United States Supreme
Court, the state of New Jersey cited health
and safety reasons for its ban on the im-
portation of most solid wastes for disposal
in the state's landfills.48 The court, how-
ever, was suspicious that New Jersey's
regulations amounted to economic prolec-
lionism. Although the purpose of the New
Jersey low was not to gain a competitive
edge for its citizens in the waste disposal
business, the effect, the legislative means,
was protectionist and therefore disol-
lowed.4' The court stated that legislation
that stops interstate commerce at the bor-
der is the "clearest example" of economic
protectionism, and virtually per se inva-
lid.50 It went on to say that the determin-
ing element in deciding whether a statute
amounts to economic protectionism "is the
attempt by one State to isolate itself from a
problem common to many by erecting a
3 Hughes, 426 U.S. at 809-10.
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439(19801.
34 Id.
* New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269(1988).
3 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envil. Quality of State of Or., 114 S. Ci 1345, 1351 (1994).
1' Id. at 1350
3S Id.
" Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628.
40 Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ci. of 1350.
' Spothose, 458 U.S. o0 944.
4 Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989).
a Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617.
" Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. 334; National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alaboma Dep't Envil. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990).
4 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. at 1345.
46 Fort Graliot Sanitary landil, 504 U.S. at 353.
4 Philadelphia. 437 U.S. at 617.
40 NewJersey low states in pertinent part:
No person shall bring into this Stoe any solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except garbage to be
fed to swine in the State of New Jersey, until the commissioner [of the State Department of Environmental Protection] shall determine that such action can be
permitted without endangering the public health, safety, and welfare and has promulgated regulations permilling and regulation the treatment and disposal of
such waste in this State.
Id. at 618, quoting NJ. SAt Am. §13:11-10 (West Supp. 19781. In accordance with this regulation, the commissioner then established four categories of waste which
would not be prohibited under the statute: swine feed, separated recyclobles, recovered potential resources, and noxious wastes headed for treatment facilities. Philadel
phla, 437 U.S. at 624.
49 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
S Id
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barrier against the movement of interstate
trade."-' The court qualified this hardline
statement, however, leaving open the pos-
sibility of a regulation which is not pot-
ently discriminatory or which serves a
compelling state interest.s2 These are the
Pike balancing test and quarantine
exceptions.
Although the Philadelphia court re-
jected the application of both exceptions,
it offered guidelines for when the excep-
tions would apply. In order to survive the
Pike balancing test, a legislative act must
not be discriminatory on its face or in
practical effect. In addition, the act may
impose only an incidental burden on inter-
state commerce and must also advance a
legitimate local concern.
The quarantine exception can only be
invoked when laws seek to discriminate
against out-of-state products not because
they come from out-of-state, but because
they are noxious or dangerous. The court
refused to apply this exception to the New
Jersey low because, it stated, "[tihe harms
caused by waste are said to arise after its
disposal in landfill sites, and at that point,
. . . there is no basis to distinguish out-of-
state waste from domestic waste. If one is
inherently harmful, so is the other.""
2. Alabama
The next attempt of regulation came
out of Alabama in the form of the Holley
Bill." The Holley Bill prohibited private
hazardous waste management facilities
from accepting hazardous materials from
out-of-state if the state in question prohib-
ited disposal of hazardous waste within
its borders and had no facility for such, or
if it had no facility and had not entered
into an agreement for disposal of hazard-
ous wastes which the state of Alabama
had signed."'
Alabama advanced three arguments
for the constitutionality of the Holley bill.
The first two, the Pike balancing test and
quarantine exception, both failed. The
third was a Congressional authorization
argument. Alabama argued that Con-
gress, through the requirements of the Su-
perfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA)56 and the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA),s7 imposed on the
states an obligation to regulate the move-
ment and disposal of hazardous wastes
within their respective borders. The court
disagreed. It stated that for Congress to
give to the states the power of regulating
or burdening interstate commerce, this
grant must be "expressly stated" and
"unmistakably clear.""' The court did
not find that level of certainty met here.
SARA, for example, required the generat-
ing state to conform with factual
requirements to assure on adequate land-
fill capacity and held the state liable for
any infraction.5 The court did not permit
this arrangement to be translated into a
grant of power that allowed receiving
states to compel adherence to federal re-
quirements by denying non-qualifying gen-
erating states access to its management
facilities.60
Two years later Alabama tried again
by imposing a "cop" on the yearly
amount of hazardous waste that could be
disposed of at a site, in addition to a two-
tiered fee system. 6' The fee systems con-
sisted of a flat per-ton fee paid by the op-
erator of the facility and an additional fee
assessed against waste generated out-of-
state.62 This was quite a departure from
the outright banning of entry of out-of-state
waste the courts had previously struck
down, and the cap and base fee survived
review. Only the additional fee was an
object of contention in this case. The
court again disallowed it, calling the stat-
ute facially discriminatory and overly bur-
densome. Although Alabama argued
that the additional fee worked to advance
legitimate state concerns,"A the court con-
cluded that, except for its point of origin,
imported waste was indistinguishable
from domestic waste and as such resulted
in discriminatory treatment.65 The court
further reasoned that the additional fee
did not constitute the least restrictive
means of protecting Alabama's interest as
required to prevent regulations from being
found facially discriminatory.?
' Id. t 628.
s Id. at 628-29.
* Id. at 629.
SAtA. CoDE § 22-3011 11989).
* Id.
* Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at Section 104(c1l9), 42 U.S.C. § 9 604(c)19)).
* Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and liability Act of 1980,42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 [1982 & Supp. V 1987).
so National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Alabama, 910 F.2dat 721 (citing SouthCeniral Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 9011984) lather
cifolions omitted).
9 Id.
m Id. "Although Congress may override the commerce clause by express statutory language, it has not done so in enacting CERCIA" (quoting Alabama v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1548, 1555 n.3).
8 Aw. CODE § 22-30b-2(o) (Supp. 1991).
6 Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. of 338. See also Ai.CODE § 22-30B-2(al (Supp. 1991): "For waste and substances which are generated outside of
Alabama and disposed of at a commercial site for the disposal of hazardous waste of hazardous substances in Alabama, on additional fee shall be levied at the role of
$72.00 perton."
-Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 342.
* Id. at 343. The Alabama Supreme Court enumerated these concems In its decision as: health and safety- environmental protection; compensatory revenue; and
waste flow control. kI., (citing Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 584 So.2d 1367, 1388-89 (199111.
65 Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 344.
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3. Michigan
On the same day, the Supreme Court
struck down Michigan's efforts in this
orena. Instead of attempting to regulate
the flow of commerce at the border of the
state, Michigan's Solid Waste Manage-
ment Act ("SWMA")6 7 required each
county within the state to develop and im-
plement waste reduction programs that
comported with state health standards.
This included a prohibition against ac-
cepting waste generated out-of-county
without Michigan's express permission. 8
Michigan argued that the SWMA dif-
fered from the law struck down in Philade-
phio because it impeded in-state, but
out-ocounty waste, and outof-state waste
equally." The court rejected this argu-
ment, stating that the existence of an
equal burden on citizens of the state did
not eliminate the discrimination, it only
lessened its effect. 70
Michigan fell back on the health and
safety regulation argument. This foiled, as
it had in cases before because Michigan
was not able to prove that SWMA served
valid health and safety goals. 1
4. Oregon
In 1994, Oregon's regulation, which
mandated a compensatory tax on waste,
was reviewed by the Supreme Court. The
Oregon statute called for a fee of $.85
per ton on domestic waste and $2.25
per ton on imported waste. 2  The
purported reasons for the discrepancy
were the disparate impact of the costs of
disposal on citizens versus non-citizens
and an effort to force out-of-state users to
"pay their fair share."" Although a legiti-
mate state interest existed, the court found
the regulation facially discriminatory and
as a result struck down the regulation.7'
The court found no basis for the asser-
tion that out-of-state waste is more expen-
sive to dispose of or process than in-state
waste.75 Nor did it think that Oregon
had successfully identified the intrastate
burden the tax purportedly compensated
for or the approximate cost of that bur-
den.76 The lack of these two elements of
a compensatory tax proved fatal to Ore-
gon's claim.
5. Pennsylvania
Finally, Pennsylvania tried to use the
market participant exception to the dor-
mant Commerce Clouse to survive judicial
review. 7 The Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources ("DER") required
that each county designate a waste facil-
ity and contract with that facility for dis-
posal of all of the county's waste.78 It
also made it illegal to dump waste in any
facility other than the county's designated
facility. 9 The counties were, in theory,
free to contract with anyone they chose,
and in that way, were participants in the
market. However, the court found that the
DER regulations acted as a constraint on
the county's ability to contract because the
contracts could only be made pursuant to
the regulations.o The court held that the
state was acting to compel the terms of
the contract and crafting the circum-
stances under which the counties could
contract. Pennsylvania, therefore, was
acting to regulate the market and was not
acting as a market participator.1
In sum, states have not succeeded in
slowing the flow of waste into their land-
fills by enacting regulations that burden
interstate commerce. Thus for, health and
safety protection, quarantine, the Pike test,
congressional authorization, compensa-
tory tax, and market participant doctrines
have all failed as defenses to such doc-
trines. As a result, Wisconsin, and those
who follow, must find other approaches to
this problem.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the court examined
a Wisconsin statute that required out-of-
state communities to implement Wisconsin-
like recycling programs in order to utilize
I Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 345. The court offered Alabama two alternatives to the additional fee that would not violate the consitution: taxing
citizen and non-citizen vehicles transporting waste by the mile, and a cop on the total waste allowed in its landfills. Id. Alabama had already enacted a tonnage limit in
ihe portion of the statute Ihat was upheld. But, asJustice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent, requiring an evenhanded 1ox on transportation would serve to impose two
to:e: on citizens, as compared to only one tax on alien. Citizens would be required to pay for inspection and regulation of waste management out of general tax
revenues as well as a tax aimed a transport, while the only burden placed on non-citizens would be the transport tax. Id. (RehnquistiJ., dissenting).
67 The statute was enacted as Mic. Comp. t.Aws AmN. §§ 299.401-.437 (West 1978). See Fort Gratiot Sanitary landfill, 504 U.S. at 356.
" MicH. Com.. LAWS ANN. § 299.41 3a.
69 Fort Gratioi Sanitary landfill, 504 U.S. at 361.
M Id.
7 The court reiterated its stand, slating that, "jthere is, however, no valid health and safety reason for limiting the amount of waste that a landfill operator may accept
trom outside the State, but not the amount that the generator may accept from inside the State." Fort Gratiot Sanitary landfill, 504 U.S. at 367.
n OpE. REv, SAt. §§ 459A.1 10(1), (5) (1991).
n Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 1351.
n id. at 1355.
n5 1d.01f1351-52.
76 Id. at 1352 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 758-59 (19811, and Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 20415 (1961) (other citations omitted).
'7 Empire Sanitary landfill, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 645 A.2d 413, 418 (1994).
n0 Id, at 416 (citing Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act of July 28, 1988, Pub. L. No. 556, codified as 53 P.S. §§ 4000.101-.1904).
79 Empire Sanitary landfill, 645 A.2d at 416.
10 Id. at 418.
0 Id at 417. Another problem with the market participant allowance, although not addressed in this case, involves the monopoly prohibition. If the state can enter into
contracts and croft them to the state's specificalions, but cannot have a monopoly or control a substantial portion of a natural resource, the success it will enjoy in
protecting its interests will be limited. The state can use its bargaining power to control the flow of waste to the landfills it owns, but the other owners are free to manage
their landfills as they please. The state cannot step in and dictate the terms of other contracts, because it will be deemed a market regulator.
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Wisconsin's landfills.8 The court held
that the practical effect of the Wisconsin
statute was to control conduct occurring
wholly outside the borders of the state and
as such was a direct violation of the Com-
merce Clause."
The court stated that, even if the Wis-
consin statute was not in direct violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause, its practi-
cal effect was impermissibly discriminatory
against out-of-state waste haulers. The
court reasoned that the statute warranted
heightened scrutiny because out-of-state
communities were forced to follow Wis-
consin recycling practices regardless of
the merit of their own recycling programs
and because the waste generated in
those communities was no more danger-
ous than waste generated in Wisconsin."
The court rejected Wisconsin's argu-
ment that the statute constitutes the least
restrictive means of enforcing its pro-
recycling policies. The court explained
that because the Wisconsin statute was
subject to heightened scrutiny, Wisconsin
was required to show that its concerns
could not "be adequately served by non-
discriminatory altematives."" The statute
clearly indicated that if recyclable materi-
als were separated and processed at a
materials recovery facility then the waste
would meet Wisconsin's environmental
needs.86 Because such a nondiscrimina-
tory alternative existed, the statute could
not be justified under a heightened scru-
tiny standard.8
Regardless of whether the preceding
two arguments were available, the court
stated that the Wisconsin statute would
still fail the balancing test laid out in
Pike." Specifically, the court reasoned
that the burdens imposed on out-of-state
haulers for outweighed any realizable
benefits for Wisconsin." Furthermore, the
court staled that Wisconsin's interests
were not furthered by requiring out-of-state
communities to conform to Wisconsin recy-
cling requirements." For these reasons
the court concluded that Wisconsin Statute
§ 159.07(3) violated the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution and was, there-
fore, invalid.
V. COvMENT
The Wisconsin statute has two impor-
tant components. The first is waste con-
taining any of eleven recyclable materials
may not be dumped in the state of Wis-
consin. No objection was made to this
prohibition. The second part, and the
real problem, is the exception to that gen-
eral prohibition. Wisconsin will allow
loads of waste that contain the outlawed
materials to be dumped if the waste is
generated by a community that presorts its
recyclables. This exception appears to
serve as a safety-net for haulers. Wiscon-
sin is aware that recycling at the curb is
not foolproof, and, thus, has allowed for
minor mistakes on the part of haulers.
Since Wisconsin is able to regulate the
disposal practices of its residents, it retains
a measure of control over how often the
exception is employed. Wisconsin can
enforce recycling at the curb, and greatly
reduce the amount of prohibited materials
dumped in its landfills.
For waste generated within Wiscon-
sin, this exception presents no controversy-
however, waste coming from outside
Wisconsin's boarders is another matter.
The objection raised by NSWMA con-
cems the measure of control over out-of-
state behavior the exception would give to
Wisconsin. The exception is predicated
on waste being generated in a community
which has a recycling program like Wis-
consin's, and, thus, compels out-of-state
users of Wisconsin's landfills to implement
such a program in an out-of-state
community.
A. Rehnquist's Dissent
Chief justice Rehnquist has dissented in
every case argued before the Supreme
Court involving Commerce Clause chal-
lenges to state waste dumping regulations
from Philadelphia through Oregon Waste
Systems. His argument is a variation on
the quarantine exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause. Rehnquist stated that,
under the existing court position on quar-
antines, a state may dispose of infectious,
dangerous, or noxious materials produced
in the state as best it can, and forbid traf-
fic of the same from out-of-state, even if the
materials are identical." So, a state can
make provisions to dispose of contagious
cattle resident to the state, and prohibit
importation of diseased cattle for disposal
at the same facilities. "The physical fact
of life that [a State] must somehow dis-
pose of its own noxious items does not
mean that it must serve as a depository for
those of every other State."" He then ap-
plied this rationale to solid waste. just
because a State has noxious solid waste
of its own to dispose of, the Commerce
Clause does not inflict on the state the
duty to dispose of the some noxious solid
82 Notional Solid Wastes Monogement Assn, 63 F.3d at 654.
* Id. of 663.
* Id. al 658.
* Governmeni Suppliers Consolidoling Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1279(7th C. I 992).
" Naional Solid Wastes Management Assn, 63 F.3d a 662.
07 Id. at 661. The court stated that requiring all waste entering the landIl to be treated ala recovery facility would fulfill Wisconsin's goals in a nondiscriminalory
way. Id. at 662. This would force on Wisconsin communities the added burden of a second screening of their waste, as Wisconsin towns were already required to
separate their refuse. In the alternative, Wisconsin could stop requiring its citizens to recycle and instead have alt the refuse treated at a reclamation facility. Bringing in
a "middleman" reclaimer to replace citizen sorting "at the curb" would greatly increases the cost of waste disposal Id.
n Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
" Notional Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 63 F.3d at 662-63.
* Id.
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 632 (Rehnquisi, J., dissenting).
id.
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waste produced from other states.' this argument, and it is difficult to imagine Its this distinction on which Wisconsin
Rehnquist noted that solid waste dis- that he will be able to persuade the pre- can capitalize. National Solid Waste
posal regulations, like Michigan's," are sent court. Management Association v. Meyer is the
indistinguishable from the regulations Ne- first case that might provide compelling
braska imposed on the exportation of wa- B. Quarantines proof that out-of-state waste is significantly
ter resources and which the court upheld The Supreme Court, in every case it different from Wisconsin waste. Wiscon-
in Sporhose. The regulations apply has considered, has denied the argument sin has imposed upon its citizens stringent
equally to instate and out-of-state consum- that a State can ban importation of waste recycling and reclamation requirements.
ers and are designed to protect against because it poses a danger to the State. Provided these requirements are ode-
excessive depletion of a natural re- In every case the court has considered, quately enforced, Wisconsin waste will
source.95 He stated that: however, the waste in question has been be substantially "cleaner" than out-of-state
Commerce Clause concerns are identical to waste produced and disposed waste that is generated in an environment
at their nadir when a state act of instate. The court has left open the free of these regulations. Wisconsin
works in this fashion - raising question of whether different, more dan- waste will not contain the eleven forbid-
prices for all the State's consum- gerous waste, could be quarantined in the den recyclable materials. In addition,
ers, and working to the substan- same way as diseased cattle or infected Wisconsin's available landfill space will
tial disadvantage of other baitfish. In fact, the court has on numer- not be squandered and the health of its
segments of the State's populo- ous occasions alluded to the fact that a citizens not endangered by noxious un-
lion - because in these circum- regulation may get court approval if it can separated waste coming from out-of-state.
stances 'a State's own political be proven that the out-of-state waste some- The challenges to this argument are
processes will serve as a check how endangers or damages the state in a three-fold. The first is defnitional. Wis-
against unduly burdensome regu- way that instate waste does not.98  consin will need to prove that this differ-
lotions' . . . In sum, the low sim- In ruling out a quarantine designation ence between its waste and out-of-state
ply incorporates the common for the Alabama additional fee provision refuse is substantial enough to constitute a
sense notion that those responsi- the court cited Guy v. Baltimore, which different "kind" of waste. Second, it also
ble for a problem should be re- said, "in the exercise of its police. powers, will need to prove that the difference
sponsible for its solution to the a State may exclude from its territory, or makes the imported waste a danger to the
degree they are responsible for prohibit the sale therein of any articles health or safety of Wisconsin citizens.
the problem but no further.' which, in its judgment, fairy exercised, Third, it will need to prove that its interest
Rehnquist argued that requiring states to are prejudicial to the health or which in conserving landfill space is a compel-
accept out-of-state solid waste would force would endanger the lives or property of its ling one.
states with low-cost available land to con- people.""O That case further stated that if The more difficult problem Wisconsin
vert that land to landfills in order to cope the regulation was of a like kind of prod- will face is convincing the court that there
with the volume of incoming waste.97  uct that was distinct only in origin, the is no alternative, non-discriminatory means
That, Rehnquist insisted, is not what the regulation would not be allowed) 0' Fur- of achieving Wisconsin's end. In Maine,
Commerce Clause is about. ther, upon declaring that the Michigan the quarantine law was upheld because
Rehnquist was joined in Philadelphia law was not a quarantine law, the court out-of-state baitfish posed a danger instate
by Chief Justice Burger, and in Fort Gro- stated that the "conclusion would be differ- baitfish did not, and available inspection
tiot and Oregon Waste Systems by justice ent if the imported waste raised health or techniques were not adequate to detect
Blackmun. With Burger and Blackmun other concerns not presented by Michigan the danger.' 03 An opponent to Wiscon-
retiring, Rehnquist has lost his support for waste."Ic1 sin could easily argue that there are
t Idomat 633.
04 Fort Groriot Santary landfill. 504 U.S. at 372.
95 in the case of solid waste disposal, the natural resource is an attractive and sa e environment." d. at 371.
6 Id., quoting Kasset v. Consolidated Freighdeiys Corp. of Del, 450 U.S. 662,675r119811 remphsis in the ouiginat).
97 Fort Graoht Santary landih, 504 U.S. at 373. a1 see no reason in the Commerce Ctause, however, that requires cheapland States to became the waste
repositories for their brethren, thereby suffering tho many risks that such sites present. td.
" The Newjersey law was found not to be a quarantine law because the waste was not damaging until after it entered the landfitt, and ot that point, it was identtcal to
t'hewjewsey generated waste. Phitadeophia, 437 U.S. at 629.
99 100 U.S. 4341(1880).
of0 insa.e The cor4hs4e3.pnh
101 td.
102 Fart Grqot Sonitafy wandhi,, 504 U.S. at 367.
g03 Maine, 477 U.S. at 15e1-52.
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alternative, less restrictive means to fulfill-
ing Wisconsin's goals, namely, reclamo-
tion and inspection.
C. Reclamation and Inspection
Wisconsin could, as the court in this
case suggested,'o require that all waste
be treated at a reclamation facility before
entering the landfills, or that it be in-
spected for the presence of the prohibited
articles. Mandatory treatment of waste at
reclamation facilities would ensure that
Wisconsin's goal of excluding recyclable
materials from its landfills is achieved. If
the requirement was imposed on domestic
and foreign waste alike, the even-handed
regulation would fall within an exception
to the Commerce Clause and would be
upheld provided that it could pass the Pike
test. Despite its probable judicial success,
Wisconsin will not likely want to imple-
ment this proposal because reclamation
facilities are both expensive to operate
and maintain. If the State undertakes the
operation itself, it faces enormous costs
which the citizens of Wisconsin must pay.
If the State leaves reclamation to private
companies, it must police those compa-
nies to ensure compliance, again, at a
high cost to Wisconsin taxpayers. These
are costs out-of-state haulers will not share,
and ones Wisconsin cannot easily pass
on via a compensatory tax.
Furthermore, because Wisconsin tax-
payers are already separating their
waste, domestic waste would be sepo-
rated twice, once at the curb and once at
the reclamation facility. If Wisconsin resi-
dents were willing to shoulder the burden
of curb-side recycling, evidenced by the
adoption of this provision, there is little
likelihood that they will be willing to pay
for someone else to do it a second time or
in their place.
Another option open to Wisconsin is
to require inspection of waste for
prohibited recyclables prior to disposal
into the landfills. Here, again, the inspec-
tion statute would need to work even-
handedly with regard to domestic and
foreign waste, as well as, satisfy the Pike
test. Instead of serving to discriminate
against out-of-state commerce by stopping
waste at the border, inspections would
take place at the disposal site and, thus,
burden Wisconsin citizen haulers with the
some requirements as non-citizen haulers.
This places it beyond the reach of strict
scrutiny since such a statute would be nei-
ther facially discriminatory nor discrimina-
tory in effect.
In order to survive the balancing test in
Pike, Wisconsin may need to limit inspec-
tions to random spot-checking. Stopping
and searching every load entering a land-
fill may so significantly slow the flow of
commerce that it constitutes an impermissi-
ble impediment or undue burden. If that
burden is not outweighed by Wisconsin's
interest in preserving landfill space and
environmental cleanliness, the plan will be
held unconstitutional. Random sampling
of loods entering the landfill may reduce
this burden to permissible levels.
D. Enforcement - Fines
Wisconsin still has an enforcement
problem. If it were allowed to inspect
every lood, it would be a simple matter to
turn back those in violation of the ban. As
a practical matter, however, turning back
a randomly chosen violator serves only to
place it forther back in the line formed at
the disposal site. There is nothing to keep
haulers from trying to sneak the same load
through again as the odds of being ran-
domly chosen on a second or third entry
attempt plummet. There must be some
form of deterrence to this type of action.
Stiff fines may serve this purpose.
Violations of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) carry fines
of up to $25,000 per day the violation
remains uncorrected.io The possibility of
such severe fines acts as a fairly good in-
centive for companies to conform with
RCRA standards. A fine not to exceed
$25,000 for each of the eleven types of
prohibited recyclables found in a hauler's
load may be sufficient for Wisconsin's
purposes. That translates into a possible
fine of as much as $275,000 for a single
load.io Such severe penalties should
have a sufficiently deterring effect so that
no hauler would dare try to dispose of
prohibited wastes in Wisconsin landfills.
Alternatively, since fines are punitive in
nature, Wisconsin may want to require a
violator to forfeit a percentage of its com-
pany assets or revenues up to a legislo-
tively set maximum. This would allow the
court to "fine until it hurts," and would al-
low a level that varies from company to
company. Both of these options leave the
court discretion to punish based on the
egregiousness of the offense or the num-
ber of violations.
Although statutorily imposed fines are
commonplace, fines have been chal-
lenged on Constitutional grounds, as vio-
lative of the Eighth Amendment. The
Eighth Amendment, although normally in-
voked in criminal cases to object to a pe-
nal sentence as being cruel or unusual,
also prohibits excessive boil and exces-
sive fines in civil cases. Eigth Amendment
challenges to court-imposed civil fines,
however, have rarely been successful.
In Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific
Railway. Co. v. Davis," the court gave
the standard for deciding when penalties
are excessive. Acceptable penalties are
"no more than reasonable and adequate
to accomplish the purpose of the law and
remedy the evil intended to be
reached."r'o The Supreme Court, in St.
Louis fron Mountain & Southern Railway
Co. v. Williams," expanded on the
'04 See supro note 44.
'" 42 U.S.C. § 69 28(g) (1988).
" 5HA is permitted to impose a fine for every individual act or single course of action without violating its "egregious penalty policy." Secretary of labor v.
Cu..rpillar Inc., OSHRC, No. 87-0922 (Feb. 5, 1993). It remains to be seen if this standard would be applied to ines for violations of Wisconsin's dumping laws and
if the presence of each of the kinds of prohibited recyclabtes would amount to separate acts or courses of action.
'" 170 S.W. 245 (1914).
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"reasonable and adequate" standard and
listed several factors to be considered
when judging a fine. When a fine "is
considered with due regard for the inter-
ests of the public, the numberless opportu-
nities for committing the offense, and the
need for securing uniform adherence . .
we think it properly cannot be said to be
so severe and oppressive as to be wholly
disproportioned to the offense or obviously
unreasonable.""o This standard leaves
the legislature with enormous latitude in
crafting fines and the courts with wide dis-
cretion in assessing them. In United States
v. Environmental Waste Control,"1 the
court gave guidelines for deciding the
magnitude of a fine. The court stated that
an Administrator must consider the serious-
ness of the violation and the efforts made
to comply with RCRA requirements in as-
sessing a fine accompanying a RCRA vio-
lation.112  Finally, in TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,'" the
court once again broadened the range of
acceptable fines, concluding that a fine
need only
bear a reasonable relationship to
the harm that is likely to occur
from the defendant's conduct as
well as to the harm that actually
has occurred. If the defendant's
actions caused or would likely
cause in a similar situation only
slight harm, the damages should
be relatively small. If the harm is
grievous, the damages should be
much greater." 4
With these restrictions in mind, the
fines imposed by Wisconsin law should
be calculated to reflect the grievousness of
the actual and potential harm to
Wisconsin's environment that would be
caused by the accelerated filling of its
landfills,"s the amount necessary to deter
potential violators, and the reasonable
relationship between the two.
Despite the Draconian nature of a rule
forbidding the dumping of recyclables
and the stiff fines associated with enforc-
ing such a rule, Wisconsin should not be
reluctant to go forward with its plan for
fear of overburdening its own citizens.
Wisconsin has already shown its willing-
ness to bear the burden of citizen refuse-
sorting and has already adopted such a
rule. As a result, Wisconsin waste is al-
ready largely free of the prohibited items
so the likelihood of one of Wisconsin's
haulers being in violation should be rela-
tively small. Furthermore, the threat of such
a fine might prove a useful incentive for
collectors and haulers to ensure that state
recycling requirements aimed at communi-
ties are being met. It would be to the
haulers advantage to enforce the state's
mandate of curb-side recycling so as to
avoid the risk of being penalized. Since
state enforcement will be reduced, on ad-
ditional waste collection fee may be
needed. If Wisconsin citizens are re-
quired to pay collectors such a fee then it
should be returned to the citizens in the
form of state tax decreases.
The second benefit to Wisconsin citi-
zens is the probable furtherance of the
State's original goal, not being forced to
dispose of out-of-state waste at all. Outof-
state haulers will be forced to screen their
refuse meticulously before transporting it to
Wisconsin landfills, and will, therefore,
incur significant costs their Wisconsin
counterparts avoid through curb-side
recycling. Furthermore, ouof-state haulers
run the heightened risk of huge penalties
levied against them if they fail in this en-
deavor. Eventually, it may become more
cost effective for them to find other dump-
ing grounds for their excess waste.
V. CONCLUSION
To date, states' efforts toward preserv-
ing landfill space have met with resistance
in the courts. This has largely been due to
the fact that states have directed their ef-
forts on the transportation of out-of-state
waste into their borders for disposal. The
Commerce Clause has consistently de-
feated these attempts. Commerce Clause
exceptions have also not been useful in
securing states' aims. In order to avoid
violating the Commerce Clause, states
must focus their efforts away from the
transportation of waste into its borders.
Even-handed regulation seems the only
answer. While Wisconsin has enacted
an even-handed regulation, its enforce-
ment policy has defeated it for the same
reasons import restrictions were struck
down: they singled out out-of-state com-
merce. A state that imposes random in-
spections and fines would work both as
an even-handed regulation and an even-
handed enforcement policy. As such, it
has a good chance of withstanding judi-
cial scrutiny, provided the state complies
with the Pike balancing test and Eighth
Amendment requirements. In the end, the
answer to the states' environmental protec-
tion problems may lie in the willingness on
the part of its citizens to burden themselves
in order to ease the burden on their
environment.
0 Id. at 246.
10 251 U.S. 63 (1919).
110 id. at 670 lupholding a $200 judgement against railroad as not violative of Eighih Amendment; the actual damages were $1.32 plus $50 attorney's fees).
" 710 F.Supp. 1172 (19891.
112 Id of 1242.
113 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2721 (1993), citing Gamesv. Fleming landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d, 897, 909(19911.
11 TXOProd.Corp., 113 S.C .at 2721.
'is The largest concerns were: 1) Wisconsin's present landfill space would be consumed by recyclable materials, 21 Wisconsin would be forced to forfet additionat
land to build new landfills, squandering Wisconsin's natural resources and inflicting on its citizens costs in terms of loss of use of these lands and decrease in value of
adjoining properties, 3) the dangers associated with landills would multiply with the increased number of landfills required, and 4) Wisconsin's air, land, and water
ecosystems would be adversely affected. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 630 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also For Graniot Landill, 504 U.S. at 373 (RehnquistJ.
dissenting).
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